Osiris Fraternal Order

Request granted.

Your Honor, the defense moves for dismissal of the charges against my client on the following grounds:

1. The information that my client disclosed related to another region and its citizens, and the status of such citizens in the Osiris Fraternal Order. At no point was it indicated that the results would not be disclosed to the other region in question, nor at any point did the Pharaoh or the Keeper of the Deshret indicate that the results should not or would not be disclosed. A reasonable person could assume that the region in question would be informed.

Mere posting of the matter in Deshret Conference Room does not necessarily lead a reasonable person to the clear conclusion that the result should be classified; an alternative, reasonable interpretation is that the Pharaoh wished for the discussion or individual votes, but not the ultimate result, to remain classified.

If a reasonable person could be uncertain in regard to the classification of information, it is an unreasonable restriction on a citizen's free speech to prohibit their discussion of such information. It is against the spirit of the State Code of Osiris and has a profoundly chilling effect on free speech for citizens to live in fear that discussing regional matters which are not clearly and explicitly classified by the appropriate authorities will lead to their prosecution, conviction, and ban.

2. Moreover, Section 6.2(c) of the State Code of Osiris explicitly requires that reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech and expression must be defined by law. Even if this Pschent finds that the restriction imposed is reasonable, the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act only defines by law that disclosure of unauthorized information is a criminal offense; that Act does not define unauthorized information and does not give any official the power to define unauthorized information. That Act only gives "government official(s) responsible for said information" the power to approve its disclosure, but not to classify it in the first place, and moreover does not define which official(s) would even have been responsible for the information disclosed by the defendant.

Because neither the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act nor any other Act of the Deshret currently defines unauthorized information nor gives any official the power to do so, any restriction against disclosure of information currently imposed is not imposed by law, and thus does not meet the State Code's threshold for restriction of freedom of speech and expression.

Thus, the defense maintains that this particular application of Section 3.1(a) of the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act is both an unreasonable restriction on the defendant's free speech and expression and a restriction that is not defined by law, violating Section 6.2(c) of the State Code of Osiris which supersedes lesser statutory law and application of such law. The defense moves that the charges be dismissed as unconstitutional.

Your Honor,

With all due respect, the prosecutions argument regarding the disclosure of the information is flawed logic at best.

The prosecution states "At no point was it indicated that the results would not be disclosed to the other region in question, nor at any point did the Pharaoh or the Keeper of the Deshret indicate that the results should not or would not be disclosed.".

Should we to apply this logic to secret operations of the Sehkmet would the defendant be equally free to disclose confidential information on the understanding that eventually the operational information would be disclosed? That there was no desire expressly provided not to have this information in the public domain? The Deshret being as significant a body to the region as it is, the implication is to be expected that information contained within is there for a specific reason and purpose, were that not to be the case, surely the information would be posted somewhere else.

an alternative, reasonable interpretation is that the Pharaoh wished for the discussion or individual votes, but not the ultimate result, to remain classified.

Again, the defence is being deliberately loose with their logic here. If one were to assume that the discussion was desired to be kept private by the Pharaoh as the defence suggests, then the implication could only be that the Pharaoh would ultimately authorize the release of the information when the time was right. As there is no evidence to suggest this was the case then I ask the defence when is it appropriate for one to release a private discussion? When one concludes for themselves that the information is now free to the public domain? Or when they are told it is? The defences above argument would only suggest the latter.

Regarding the defences second argument,

"Even if this Pschent finds that the restriction imposed is reasonable, the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act only defines by law that disclosure of unauthorized information is a criminal offense; that Act does not define unauthorized information and does not give any official the power to define unauthorized information. "

The law cannot be written to each and every single situation, this would be impractical at best and ridiculous at worst. Hand in hand with the law is an expectation of common sense. As I will be introducing to the court in due course, there was a disclaimer provided in the Deshret room that information contained therein was privy to the Deshret, this sets up a reasonable expectation to any party within that the information was of sensitive or important nature. Common sense can only dictate that this information then would be considered of importance and therefore protected. The defences argument that no individual as the power to define unauthorized information is nothing more than a convoluted ploy to get his client off on an imaginary technicality and to acknowledge it would serve to undermine both the Codex and the security of all government information in the region.

Because neither the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act nor any other Act of the Deshret currently defines unauthorized information nor gives any official the power to do so, any restriction against disclosure of information currently imposed is not imposed by law, and thus does not meet the State Code's threshold for restriction of freedom of speech and expression

Again, the defence counsel here has chosen to focus on unauthorized information, however, we are not here to debate the merits of unauthorized information nor the law pertaining to that. We are here to discuss information that was authorized by disclaimer under the Deshret as being confidential which was moved by the defendant to a public domain and this in violation of Section 3.1(a) as the law is written at the point in time.

Lastly, the defence has attempted to state that the charges ultimately constitute a breech of the rights afforded to the defendant under the state code, however, the state code was not designed to supersede the law and provide a shield for those who wish to cause discord within the community. Freedom of speech was designed to allow members of the community to speak their minds and opinions with fear of reprisal for doing so, not to leak privileged information and then hide behind their "rights" when due process catches up with them.

Your Honor, with great respect for the Pschent, the defense also moves for declaration of a mistrial and, separately, dismissal of the charges against my client with prejudice on the grounds that the threshold for a speedy trial, guaranteed by Section 6.2(g) of the State Code of Osiris, has not been met.

It has now been ten days since the defense filed pre-trial motions and since the time allowed for pre-trial motions concluded, with no response from the Pschent and no statement in regard to the reason for this delay. It is clear that the trial against my client will, at minimum, span the duration of the minimum sentence prescribed by Section 3.2 of the Criminal Codex of the Osiris Fraternal Order Act for the crime which my client is accused of committing.

The defense maintains that this is an unreasonable delay, in the absence of any compelling interest of justice that the delay is serving, and that my client's right to a speedy trial has therefore been violated since the delay cannot be reasonably justified as serving the interests of justice. Because this delay has been caused by the Pschent and not through any fault of my client, we maintain that it would be unjust for my client to again face charges that, if dismissed, will be dismissed due to the Pschent's inactivity, that jeopardy applies, and that the charges should be dismissed with prejudice.

Your honor, at this time we have no objection to the request for dismissal of the defence team in this regard.

I will accept the motion for mistrial, on account of the violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. This violation has occured because of the undue delays in the proceedings caused by the presiding judge.

I will not accept the motion for dismissal of the charges with prejudice. No facts have been decided, and there was no malice or intent in the presiding judge's actions that induced the mistrial.

Therefore, all charges against the defendant are dismissed without prejudice.

I thank both the prosecution and the defense for their time and cooperation. This matter is now closed.